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INCOMPLETE FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION: EXCLUSIVE MARKETS,
INVESTMENT CLUBS AND CREDIT RISK
VI´CTOR PE´REZ FERNA´NDEZ AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MARTI´NEZ
Abstract. We develop a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial participation and
price dependent financial constraints. In our model, equilibrium exists even when agents do not
have access to all financial contracts. For instance, exclusive credit lines and investment clubs are
compatible with our framework. We also extend the literature of incomplete financial participa-
tion to include debts backed by price dependent collateral, and non-ordered preferences negatively
affected by the amount of default.
Keywords: Incomplete financial participation - Exclusive credit lines - Collateralized loans
1. Introduction
There are several types of participation constraints in modern financial markets, restricting the
access to credit or the availability of investment opportunities. For instance, debt constraints in the
form of collateral requirements or margins calls are usually used by financial markets as a mechanism
to reduce the aggregated risk of default. Also, barriers in the access to investment, that may depend
on credit scores or on the amount of wealth, can allow traders to participate in investment clubs,
obtaining exclusive access to financial opportunities with a reduced risk of default.
In this work we include these financial practices in an abstract model of general equilibrium,
allowing for incomplete financial markets, price dependent financial constraints and non-ordered
preferences. As byproducts of our analysis we obtain extensions of several models of general equi-
librium to include incomplete financial participation. Particularly, we extend the traditional models
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of incomplete markets to allow for exclusive credit lines and investment clubs. Also, we can make
financial participation constraints compatible with equilibrium in sophisticated financial markets,
where debts are subject to credit risk and are securitized into investment assets.
Our results can be included into a growing literature of general equilibrium with financial par-
ticipation constraints. This literature departs from equilibrium models with incomplete financial
markets and unconstrained portfolio sets,1 including additional restrictions in both debt and invest-
ment opportunities. In this direction, assuming that financial trades are restricted to a closed and
convex set of portfolios with contains zero, equilibrium existence is analyzed by Siconolfi (1986)
under a financial survival condition, which guarantee that independently of prices, all agents have
access to a positive amount of resources through any credit line. With financial survival conditions
and linear restrictions as a form of financial participation constraints, the existence of equilibrium
is studied, for the case of nominal assets, by Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi (1990), Aouani and Cornet
(2009) and Cornet and Ranjan (2011). The real asset market case is studied by Polemarchakis and
Siconolfi (1997), when financial participation constraints are given by linear restrictions, and by
Angeloni and Cornet (2006) for a more general case where portfolio sets are required to be convex
and compact. Without financial survival, Aouani and Cornet (2009) proves that equilibrium can
be ensured under a non-redundancy assumption over financial markets. Recently, Aouani and Cor-
net (2011) proves equilibrium existence with financial participation constraints in a model where
either portfolio sets are defining by a finite number of linear inequalities or financial participation
constraints satisfy a non-arbitrage condition. Alternatively, with a spanning condition over the set
of admissible portfolios, which requires the closed cone generated by the union of portfolio sets
to be a linear space, Cornet and Gopalan (2010) shows equilibrium existence for nominal assets
markets. Assuming that agents are impatient, Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) address an in-
complete markets model where financial participation constraints are endogenous, since depend on
the amount of consumption. In that model, equilibrium exists without need to impose financial
survival, non-redundancy assumptions or spanning conditions over admissible portfolios.
When financial participation constraints emerge endogenously due to regulatory, institutional or
budgetary considerations, it is natural to allow this restrictions to depend on market prices. This
possibility is considered by Cass, Siconolfi and Villanacci (2001), where financial constraints depends
on asset prices; and by Carosi, Gori and Villanacci (2009), where restricted participation is given
by functions that depend on commodity and asset prices.
1See, for instance, the real asset markets model of Duffie and Shafer (1985, 1986), where generic existence of
equilibrium is analyzed. Also, equilibrium existence in unconstrained financial markets is addressed by Cass (2006),
Werner (1985), Duffie (1987), and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
Exclusive Credit Lines, Investment Clubs and Credit Risk 3
Analogously to Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011), in our model we suppose that agents are
impatient, in the sense that a reduction of consumption at the second period can be always com-
pensated by an increment in the quantity of commodities consumed at the first period. Therefore,
we ensure the existence of competitive equilibrium without need to include financial survival as-
sumptions, spanning conditions over admissible portfolios, or require financial constraints to satisfy
non-arbitrage conditions.
More precisely, we consider a two-period model where commodities may be durable, perishable
or may transform into other goods through time. There is a finite number of agents, which demand
commodities, negotiated credit contracts and invest in assets obtained by the securitization of debts.
Agents are burden by participation constraints, that can bound the access to credit or investment
opportunities. These constraints may depend on prices and on consumption allocations. Allowing
preferences to be non-ordered, we prove the existence of equilibrium under technical conditions over
the correspondences that determine financial constraints (continuity, convexity, compacticity). Also,
we include credit risk by allow borrowers to choose, associated to a same amount of debt, different
payments at the second period. The amount of default can negatively affect individual preferences.
Our approach is compatible with markets where, independently of prices, only a subset of agents
have access to some credit contract (exclusive credit lines). Also, we can restrict the access to
investment as a function of the amount of wealth, inducing endogenous investment clubs.
As corollaries of our main result, we capture several extension of traditional models of general
equilibrium. We extend the model of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Zame (1995) and Geanakoplos and
Zame (1997, 2002, 2007) to allow for non-ordered preferences, price dependent physical and finan-
cial collateral requirements, exclusive credit lines and investment clubs. Also, we include incomplete
financial participation and collateralized debts in the model of default and punishment of Dubey,
Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990, 2005) and Zame (1993), allowing for non-ordered preferences nega-
tively affected by amounts of default.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our abstract model
with endogenous financial participation. In Section 3 we introduce the required assumptions to
ensure the existence of equilibrium and we state our main result. Section 4 is devoted to the
discussion of the compatibility of our model with exclusive credit lines and investment clubs. In
Section 5 we apply our main result to extend several models of the literature of general equilibrium
to include incomplete financial participation. Technical proof are given in the Appendix.
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2. An Abstract Model with Incomplete Financial Participation
We consider an economy with two periods t ∈ {0, 1} and uncertainty about which state of nature
of a finite set S = {1, ..., S} will prevail at t = 1. There is only one state of nature at t = 0, denoted
by s = 0. Let S∗ = {0}⋃S.
Commodities are perfectly divisible and subject to transformations between periods. Let L =
{1, . . . , L} be the finite set of commodities in the economy, which are available for trade in spot
markets at any state of nature s ∈ S∗. The commodity space is X = RL(S+1)+ and p = (ps; s ∈
S∗) ∈ ∆S+1 denotes the vector of unitary commodity prices, where ∆ =
{
v ∈ RL+ :
∑
l∈L
vl = 1
}
.
There exists the possibility of depreciation, durability or transformation of commodities between
periods. Thus, one unit of commodity l consumed at the first period is transformed in a bundle
(Ys(l′, l); l′ ∈ L) at the state of nature s ∈ S, where the matrix Ys = (Ys(l′, l); (l′, l) ∈ L × L) has
non-negative entries.
There is a finite set of agents H = {1, . . . ,H} which demand commodities at each state of nature.
Each h ∈ H receives physical endowments wh = (whs ; s ∈ S∗) ∈ X and chooses a consumption plan
xh = (xhs ; s ∈ S∗) ∈ X. Cumulated endowments of agent h are given by Wh = (Wh0 , (Whs ; s ∈
S)) := (wh0 , (w
h
s + Ysw
h
0 ; s ∈ S)). Agents can trade financial contracts to smooth consumption
between periods and their preferences can depend on the amount of financial default. Thus, before
introduce the characteristics of individual’s preferences, we will explain as financial markets works.
Financial markets are composed by debt contracts and assets obtained by the securitization of
those debts. There is a finite set of debt contracts J = {1, ..., J}. Each agent h that negotiates
ϕhj ∈ R+ units of a debt contract j receives a quantity of resources γjϕhj at the first period, where
γj ∈ R+ is the amount of resources obtained for each unit of debt contract j that was issued. After
choose a position ϕhj on j, agent h will choose to pay, at each state of nature s ∈ S, an amount
of resources δhs,j ∈ Ωs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕhj ), where the correspondence Ωs,j : ∆ × ∆ × R+ × R+  R+
associates prices and financial positions on debt contract j with admissible payments at state of
nature s ∈ S.2 For convenience of notations, denote by γ = (γj ; j ∈ J ) the vector of unitary
prices for loans, by ϕh = (ϕhj ; j ∈ J ) the positions of agent h ∈ H on debt contracts, and by
δh = (δhs,j ; (s, j) ∈ S × J ) the payments made by agent h at the second period.
Financial positions on a debt contract j ∈ J are securitized into only one asset, which is also
denoted by j. Thus, payments made by agents that negotiated debt contract j are pooled and
distributed to investors on security j. Each unit of this security can be traded at the first period
by a price qj ∈ R+ and delivers, at each state of nature s ∈ S, a unitary payment Rs,j ∈ R+. We
denote by q = (qj ; j ∈ J ) the unitary prices of securities, by R = (Rs,j ; (s, j) ∈ S × J ) the vector
2With this specification we can allow for models where promises associated to a debt contract are subject to
default (see Sections 4 and 5 for specific applications).
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of security payments, and by θh = (θhj ; j ∈ J ) ∈ RJ+ the financial positions of an agent h ∈ H on
securities j ∈ J .
We allow financial positions to be restricted at the first period. That is, each agent h ∈ H is
constrained to choose portfolios in the set Φh(p, xh), where Φh : ∆S+1× X RJ+×RJ+. Thus, credit
and investment opportunities can depend on commodity prices and on the purchases of commodities,
as in the case of borrowing associated to collateralized loans.
In our specification of rules (Φh;h ∈ H), which determine the incomplete financial participation
in our economy, is not necessary to impose a financial survival assumption, allowing agents to have
access to credit in all debt contracts (see Angeloni and Cornet (2006), Aouani and Cornet (2009,
2011) and Cornet and Ranjan (2011)). Moreover, different to Cornet and Gopalan (2010), we do
not need to require financial accessibility , a linear spanning condition which ensure that a fraction
of any financial transfer among states of nature in S can be implemented by some agent. Therefore,
as particular cases of our analysis, we guarantee equilibrium existence in economies with exclusive
credit lines and/or investment clubs (see Section 4).
The absence of assumptions about financial survival or financial accessibility implies that budget
set correspondences may have empty interior when commodity prices are equal to zero. For this
reason, we restrict commodity prices to belong into the simplex. Therefore, to prove equilibrium
existence in our economy, we need to found upper bounds on financial prices. We prove that these
upper bounds exist as a consequence of two key assumptions. We assume that requirements of
investment induced by financial constraints (Φh;h ∈ H) satisfy some regularity conditions, which
avoid cycles in the process to bound financial prices using upper bounds on security cost (see
Assumptions (A4) and (A5) below). Also, we suppose that agents are impatient, in the sense that
they accept to move from any consumption plan to another physical allocation provided that they
receive today an amount of consumption high enough (see Assumption (A2)).
For convenience of notations, it is useful to introduce the set of portfolios which are compatible
with financial participation restrictions and give access to net credit on a debt contract j. That is,
given h ∈ H, we define Ψhj : ∆S+1 × X RJ+ × RJ+ by Ψhj (p, x) :=
{
(θ, ϕ) ∈ Φh(p, x) : ϕj > θj
}
.
With the aim to determine the interdependence between debt and investment constraints, we
consider the set of securities required to have access to credit through market k, denoted by Jk. A
security j ∈ Jk if and only if there exists (p, x, h) ∈ ∆S+1 ×X×H and (θ, ϕ) ∈ Ψhk(p, x) such that:
(i) θj > 0, and (ii) for any (θ˜, ϕ˜) ∈ Ψhk(p, x), either θ˜j > 0 or ϕ˜k − θ˜k < ϕk − θk. It follows from
definition above that, given (θ, ϕ) ∈ Ψhk(p, x), there always exists a portfolio (θ˜, ϕ˜) ∈ Ψhk(p, x) that
gives at least the same access to debt contract k than (θ, ϕ), but without require any investment
on securities j ∈ J \ Jk. Therefore, the relationship between credit and investment requirements
can be summarized by the matrix B = (bk,j) ∈MJ({0, 1}), where bk,j = 1 if and only if j ∈ Jk. To
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avoid cycles generated by the restrictions imposed by our financial constraints, we require regularity
conditions over the matrix B (see Assumption (A5)).
Each agent h ∈ H is characterized by preferences that may depend of both consumption alloca-
tions and amounts of default, through a correspondence Ph : X× RSJ+  X× RSJ+ . More precisely,
given a plan of consumption x ∈ X and amounts of default d = (ds,j)(s,j)∈S×J ∈ RSJ+ , the set of
allocations (x′, d′) that agent h strictly prefer to (x, d) is given by the set Ph(x, d).
For prices (p, q, γ) ∈ P := ∆S+1×RJ+×RJ+ and security promises R ∈ RSJ+ , the budget set of agent
h, denoted by Bh(p, q, γ,R), is given by the set of plans (x, θ, ϕ, δ) ∈ E := RL(S+1)+ ×RJ+×RJ+×RSJ+
such that,
((θ, ϕ), δs,j) ∈ Φh(p, x)× Ωs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj), ∀(s, j) ∈ S × J ,
p0x0 +
∑
j∈J
(qjθj − γjϕj) ≤ p0wh0 ; psxs ≤ pswhs + psYsx0 +
∑
j∈J
(Rs,jθj − δs,j).
For any h ∈ H, the financial default induced by (x, θ, ϕ, δ) ∈ Bh(p, q, γ,R) is measured through a
function dh : ∆S+1 ×RJ+ ×RJ+ ×RSJ+ → RSJ+ , where dh(p, γ, ϕ, δ) = (dhs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj , δs,j); (s, j) ∈
S × J ). For convenience of notations, let Dh : ∆S+1 × RJ+ × E X× RSJ+ be the function defined
by Dh(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)) = (x, dh(p, γ, ϕ, δ)).
Taking as given prices (p, q, γ) ∈ P and security promises R ∈ RSJ+ , each agent h ∈ H chooses the
most preferred allocation on Bh(p, q, γ,R). That is, any h ∈ H chooses a vector (xh, θh, ϕh, δh) ∈ E
such that Ph(Dh(p, γ, (xh, θh, ϕh, δh)))
⋂
Dh(p, γ,Bh(p, q, γ,R)) = ∅.
Definition. An equilibrium is given by a vector of prices and promises (p, q, γ,R) ∈ P×RSJ+ jointly
with individual allocations ((xh, θ
h
, ϕh, δ
h
);h ∈ H) ∈ EH such that :
(i) For each agent h ∈ H, (xh, θh, ϕh, δh) ∈ Bh(p, q, γ,R).
(ii) Agents make optimal choices,
Ph(Dh(p, γ, (xh, θ
h
, ϕh, δ
h
))) ∩Dh(p, γ,Bh(p, q, γ,R)) = ∅, ∀h ∈ H.
(iii) Physical and asset markets clearing conditions hold,∑
h∈H
xh =
∑
h∈H
Wh
∑
h∈H
qjθ
h
j =
∑
h∈H
γjϕ
h
j , ∀j ∈ J .
(iv) For any j ∈ J , security payments are non-trivial, i.e. (Rs,j ; s ∈ S) 6= 0, and total payments
must be equal the aggregated amount of deliveries,
Rs,j
∑
h∈H
θ
h
j =
∑
h∈H
δ
h
s,j , ∀s ∈ S.
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3. Equilibrium Existence
In this section we impose hypotheses to ensure that equilibrium always exists in our abstract
economy.
Assumption A1. Correspondences (Ph;h ∈ H) are open, irreflexive, strictly increasing on X and
have convex values. If (x′, d′) ∈ Ph(x, d), then (x′, 0) ∈ Ph(x, d). In addition, (Wh;h ∈ H) 0.
The first requirements imposed on Assumption (A1), about continuity, monotonicity and con-
vexity of preferences, are traditional in the literature of equilibrium (see Gale and Mas-Colell (1976,
1979)). In addition, we impose a monotonicity requirement on preferences’ default dependence.
Precisely, departing from any allocation (x, d), if we pick another one that is preferred than it by
an agent h, then the allocation obtained from the later by the reduction of the amount of default
to zero is still better than (x, d). Notice that, this requirement is different than assume that Ph is
decreasing in d: (x, d′) ∈ Ph(x, d), for any 0 ≤ d′ < d, because this last requirement is compatible
only with models where all agent have preferences that effectively depend on the amount of default.
The following hypothesis is one of the keys to show equilibrium existence without need to impose
financial survival assumptions, spanning conditions, or financial accessibility requirements.
Assumption A2. There exists τh : X×X→ RL+ continuous, such that, for any y = (ys; s ∈ S∗) 0,((
y0 + τh(x, y), (ys; s ∈ S)
)
, d
) ∈ Ph(x, d), ∀(x, d) ∈ X× RSJ+ .
This hypothesis is a type of impatience condition: any individual can improve his level of satis-
faction by change his consumption allocation to another one, provided that the latter delivers a
sufficient higher amount of resources to be consumed at the first period. In the context of models
with ordered preferences, Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011, Assumption A3) was the first that
impose this type of requirement to avoid financial survival conditions.
To prove the existence of equilibrium in our abstract economy, we will need that budget set
correspondences be continuous and convex valued.
Assumption A3. For any h ∈ H, Φh : ∆S+1 × X RJ+ × RJ+ has closed graph and satisfies:
(i) for any x ∈ X, p Φh(p, x) is continuous;
(ii) for any p ∈ ∆S+1, x Φh(p, x) has convex graph;
(iii) given p ∈ ∆S+1, we have 0 ∈ Φh(p, x) ⊆ Φh(p, x˜), for any x ≤ x˜.
If admissible financial payments are well behaved (see Assumption (A7)), then the upper hemi-
continuity of budget set correspondences is ensured using the closed graph property above, jointly
8 V. Pe´rez and J.P. Torres-Mart´ınez
with the continuity of Φh(·, x). Lower-hemicontinuity of budget set correspondences follows from
(A3)(ii)-(iii).
Although we do not impose any financial survival assumption, we assume that for any price
and for any consumption level, there exists at least one agent that have access to credit on a debt
contract j ∈ J . Indeed, in other case, a debt contract does not exists as a financial instrument.
Also, it is always possible to have access to credit j without need to invest into the security j. This
conditions are summarized in the following hypothesis.
Assumption A4. For any (p, x, j) ∈ ∆S+1 × RL(S+1)++ × J ,
⋃
h∈H
Ψhj (p, x) 6= ∅.
Given (θ, ϕ) ∈ Ψhj (p, x), there is (θ˜, ϕ) ∈ Ψhj (p, x) such that θ˜j = 0.
We want to avoid cycles of financial constraints in our economy. Thus, the following requirement
ensure that, if the possession of some securities is required to obtain access to credit through contract
j, then investment in j can not be required to obtain credit from debt contracts associated to these
securities.
Assumption A5. There exists α > 0 such that, for any α > α, if (I − αB)y ≥ 0 then y ≥ 0.
We need admissible debt positions to be bounded. Although it is a strong assumption in a variety
of general equilibrium models, we will impose it in our abstract economy. However, in most of the
applications that we make the boundedness of debt appears endogenously.
Assumption A6. For any (p, x, h) ∈ ∆S+1 ×X×H, the set {ϕ ∈ RJ+ : ∃θ ∈ RJ+, (θ, ϕ) ∈ Φh(p, x)}
is compact.
We introduce some requirements on the set of admissible financial payments. The hypotheses
below are essential to ensure that budget set correspondences are well behaved: continuous, with
convex and compact values.
Assumption A7. Correspondences (Ωs,j ; (s, j) ∈ S×J ) are continuous and have non-empty values.
Given (p0, ps, γj) ∈ ∆×∆× R+, ϕj  Ωs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj) has convex graph.
Assumption A8. For some M > 0, given (p, q, γ) ∈ P, Ωs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj) ⊆ [0,Mϕj ], ∀(s, j) ∈
S × J .
The next requirement ensure that each security is non-trivial. That is, it has a positive promise
at least in some state of nature at the second period.
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Assumption A9. There exists νs,j : ∆×∆→ R+ such that, Ωs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj) ⊆ [νs,j(p0, ps)ϕj ,+∞].
For any j ∈ J , if p 0 then (νs,j(p0, ps); s ∈ S) 6= 0.
Finally, continuity and convexity of default functions are needed to obtain well defined individuals’
best reply correspondences. Also, agents can pay their promises (no default is always feasible).
Assumption A10. Functions (dh;h ∈ H) are continuous and convex on (ϕ, δ).
For any h ∈ H, given (p, x, γ) ∈ ∆S+1 × X× RJ+ and (θ, ϕ) ∈ Φh(p, x),
0 ∈ dhs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj ,Ωs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj)), ∀(s, j) ∈ S × J .
Our main result is the following,
Theorem. Suppose that Assumption (A1)-(A10) hold. Then, there exists an equilibrium for our
economy where (p, q, γ) 0 and q = γ.
The following corollary extends the main result of Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) to allow for
non-ordered preferences and financial participation constraints over investment. As byproducts of
this corollary, we obtain results of existence of equilibrium with nominal, real or collateralized assets
discussed by Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011), allowing for more general types of preferences and
investment restrictions.
Corollary. Suppose that Assumptions (A1)-(A6) hold.
In addition, assume that,
(i) For any h ∈ H, there is Φ˜h : X→ RJ+ ×RJ+ such that, for any p ∈ ∆S+1, Φh(p, ·) = Φ˜h(·).
(ii) For any (s, j) ∈ S × J , there exists a continuous function V sj : ∆ → R+ such that,
Ωs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj) =
{
V sj (ps)ϕj
}
. Given j ∈ J and (ps; s ∈ S) 0, (V sj (ps); s ∈ S) 6= 0.
(iii) For any h ∈ H, (dh;h ∈ H) = 0.
Then, there exists an equilibrium where (p, q, γ) 0 and q = γ.
Proof. It is sufficient to ensure that Assumption (A7)-(A10) hold. First, hypothesis (ii) assures
that Ωs,j is continuous and that ϕj  Ωs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj) has convex graph, which implies that (A7)
holds. Functions {V sj ; (s, j) ∈ S×J } have a maximum value–because they are continuous–a property
which guarantee that (A8) is satisfied. Since for any p 0, (V sj (ps); s ∈ S) 6= 0, Assumption (A9)
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holds. The absence of default and the validity of Assumption (A10) are a consequence of hypotheses
(ii)-(iii). From our main result, we conclude that this economy has a non-trivial equilibrium. 
4. Equilibrium with Exclusive Credit Lines and Investment Clubs
In our model we do not impose financial survival assumptions and, therefore, we can ensure the
existence of equilibrium even when agents have access to only a subset of credit contracts and/or
investment opportunities. Thus, the degree of market incompleteness does not depends only of
prices, but also on the access to financial contracts.
Given prices p ∈ ∆S+1, assume that agent h can only invests in securities that belong into a set
Jθ(p) ⊂ J , and he has access to credit only through contracts that are in Jϕ(p) ⊂ J . That is, for
any x ∈ X we have that,
(θ, ϕ) ∈ Φh(p, x) =⇒ (θj , ϕk) = 0, ∀j /∈ J hθ (p), ∀k /∈ J hϕ (p),
∃(θ˜, ϕ˜) ∈ Φh(p, x) : (θj , ϕk) 0, ∀(j, k) ∈ J hθ (p)× J hϕ (p).
It follows that, at prices p ∈ ∆S+1, a security j is an investment opportunity only for agents in
Hθ,j(p) := {h ∈ H : j ∈ J hθ (p)}. Analogously, a credit line k ∈ J is available only for agents in
Hϕ,k(p) := {h ∈ H : k ∈ J hϕ (p)}.
We refer to a non-empty set of agents H′ ( H as an investment club—compatible with prices
p ∈ ∆S+1—if there is a subset of securities J ′ ⊂ J such that H′ ⊆ ⋂
j∈J ′
Hθ,j(p). In addition, a
credit contract j constitutes an exclusive credit line at prices p if Hϕ,j(p) /∈ {∅,H}.
As we said above, the absence of financial survival assumptions allow us to prove equilibrium
existence in economies where the set of investment clubs and exclusive credit lines is non-empty.
That is, economies where Assumptions (A1)-(A10) are compatible withJ ′ ⊂ J : ∃p ∈ ∆S+1, ⋂
j∈J ′
Hθ,j(p) 6= ∅
 6= ∅ and {j ∈ J : ∃p ∈ ∆S+1,Hϕ,j(p) /∈ {∅,H}} 6= ∅.
We illustrate this possibility with the following example.
Example. Suppose that (Ys; s ∈ S) = 0 and J = {j1, j2, j3}. For any h ∈ H, given (p, x) ∈
∆S+1 × X, the set Φh(p, x) is equal to the family of portfolios (θ, ϕ) ∈ R3+ × R3+ such that,
θj1 ∈
[
0,min
s∈S
F1
([
psw
h
s − ps%
]+)]
, ϕj2 ∈
[
0,min
s∈S
F2
(
[psε− pswhs ]+
)]
,
∑
j∈J
psAj ϕj ∈
[
0,min
s∈S
F3
(
psw
h
s
)]
,
where (Aj ; j ∈ J ) ∈ RL×3++ , (%, ε) ∈ RL+×RL+, and (F1, F2, F3) are continuous and satisfy (F1(0), F2(0)) =
0. In addition, assume that (dh;h ∈ H) = 0 and, for any (h, s, j) ∈ H×S ×J , Ωhs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj) =
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{psAjϕj}. Thus, it follows that Assumptions (A3)-(A10) hold. Therefore, if we assume that prefer-
ences and endowments satisfy (A1)-(A2), always exists an equilibrium with strictly positive prices.
In this model, an agent can invest in j1 if and only if, at any s ∈ S, his physical wealth is greater
than the market value of %. Hence, the investment club associated to security j1 at prices p is given
by Hj1(p) := {h ∈ H : pswhs > ps%, ∀s ∈ S}, which is non-empty if max
h∈H
min
(s,l)∈S×L
whs,l > max
l∈L
%l.
On the other hand, we have a financial market where the bankruptcy law protects investors in
case of default. Thus, debt constraints depend on the non-exempt resources that the borrower has
at the state of nature s ∈ S, F3(pswhs ), and borrowers never defaults on their promises. Therefore,
there is no loss of generality if we suppose that, for any asset j ∈ J , there is only one admissible
payment: the market value of the original promise, psAj .
Note that line of credit j2 is exclusive to low income borrowers. Indeed, an agent can borrow
resources through debt contract j2 if and only if the value of his physical endowments, at any state
of nature at the second period, is lower than the value of ε.
Therefore, if we assume that
max
h∈H
min
(s,l)∈S×L
whs,l > max
l∈L
{εl, %l} > min
l∈L
{εl, %l} > min
h∈H
max
(s,l)∈S×L
whs,l
then, independently of prices, we have both an investment club and an exclusive credit line in our
economy. 
5. Applications to Credit Risk Models
Our framework is general enough to capture a variety of general equilibrium models with incom-
plete financial markets and credit risk. We illustrate this possibility making applications of our
main result to models with collateralized asset markets, and to economies where preferences are
negatively affect by the amount of default.
Collateralized asset markets. Suppose that the set of debt contracts J is characterized by
Φh(p, x) =
(θ, ϕ) ∈ Zh : x0 ≥∑
j∈J
Cj(p0)ϕj
 , ∀h ∈ H,
Ωs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj) = {min {psAs,j , psYsCj(p0)}ϕj} , ∀(s, j) ∈ S × J ,
where, for each (h, j) ∈ H × J , Zh ⊂ RJ+ × RJ+, Cj : ∆→ RL+, and (As,j ; s ∈ S) ∈ RL×S+ .
Then, we have a model with collateralized debt, where promises are real, (As,j ; (s, j) ∈ S × J ),
collateral coefficients may depend on prices, (Cj(p0); j ∈ J ); and agent can also suffer additional
restrictions on their financial participation through sets (Zh;h ∈ H).
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In this model, the only payment enforcement mechanism in case of default is the seizure of
collateral guarantees. That is, individual preferences do not depends on the level of default. Thus,
for any h ∈ H there exists Qh : X X such that Ph(x, d) = Qh(x), for any x ∈ X.
We assume that Assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold. Also, for any j ∈ J , there exists a non-empty
set Lj ⊆ L such that, for any price p0 ∈ ∆, Cj,l(p0) 6= 0 ⇔ l ∈ Lj . That is, independently of
prices, collateral requirements associated to asset j are always constituted by positive quantities of
the same commodities. Then, it is not difficult to verify that Assumptions (A3) and (A6) hold,
provided that functions {Cj ; j ∈ J } be continuous and sets (Zh;h ∈ H) be non-empty, closed and
convex, with 0 ∈ ⋂
h∈H
Zh.
Suppose that, for any h ∈ H, there are sets Zhθ ⊂ RJ+ and Zhϕ ⊂ RJ+ such that Zh = Zhθ ×Zhϕ. Also,
for some a > 0, (a, . . . , a) ∈ ⋃
h∈H
Zhϕ.
3 Then, Assumption (A4) is satisfied. Under the hypotheses
imposed above, the matrix B = 0 and, therefore, Assumption (A5) holds.
Assumptions (A7) and (A8) are satisfied by construction. If for any j ∈ J there is s ∈ S such that
As,j 6= 0 and
( ∑
l′∈Lj
Ys(l, l′); l ∈ L
)
6= 0, then Assumption (A9) holds too. Taking (dh;h ∈ H) = 0,
we guarantee the validity of (A10).
Under these conditions, and as a direct consequence of our main result, we obtain the existence of
equilibrium in a financial market composed by collateralized debt where: (i) collateral requirements
may depends on prices; (ii) borrowers may suffer financial participation constraints in addition to
the requirement of constitute collateral guarantees; and (iii) individual preferences may be neither
ordered nor transitive. That is, we extend the seminal work of Geanakoplos and Zame (1997, 2002,
2007) in several dimensions.
Financial collateral. Since in our abstract model we allow investment opportunities to be
restricted as a function of prices, we can use our main result to include financial collateral in the
model of Geanakoplos and Zame (1997, 2002, 2007).
For instance, following the notation of the previous application, assume that there exists j1 ∈ J
such that, for any h ∈ H,
Φh(p, x) =
(θ, ϕ) ∈ Zhθ × Zhϕ : x0 ≥ Cj1(p0)ϕj1 ∧ θj1 ≥∑
j 6=j1
Cj(p0)ϕj
 ,
and, for any (s, j) ∈ S × J ,
Ωs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj) =
 {min {psAs,j , psYsCj(p0)}ϕj} , if j = j1,{min {psAs,j ,min {psAs,j1 , psYsCj1(p0)}Cj(p0)}ϕj} , if j 6= j1,
3Note that, under previous assumptions, for any (h, α) ∈ H× {θ, ϕ}, the set Zhα is non-empty, closed, convex and
contains the vector zero.
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where Cj1 : ∆ → RL+ and {Cj : ∆ → R++; j 6= j1} are the functions that determine unitary
collateral coefficients (physical or financial). With the specification above, the loan j1 is backed by
physical collateral, and to negotiate any other debt contract it is necessary to constitute a financial
collateral in units of asset j1. As in the previous application, we concentrate in the seizure of
collateral guarantees as payment enforcement mechanism. Thus, preferences do not depend of the
amount of default.
To prove equilibrium existence in this context, we need to guarantee that Assumptions (A1)-
(A10) hold. We impose (A1)-(A2). Also, for any h ∈ H, sets Zhθ and Zhϕ satisfy the same hypotheses
imposed in the previous application, where sets (Zhθ ;h ∈ H) do not induce any restriction on the
amount of investment on j1. Suppose that {Cj ; j ∈ J ) are continuous functions and there is L1 ⊆ L
such that, for each p0 ∈ ∆, Cj1,l(p0) 6= 0 ⇔ l ∈ L1. Then, (A3)-(A5) and (A7)-(A8) are satisfied.4
To obtain Assumption (A9) it is sufficient to assume that, for any j ∈ J , there exists s ∈ S such
that, As,j 6= 0, As,j1 6= 0, and
( ∑
l′∈L1
Ys(l, l′); l ∈ L
)
6= 0. If (dh;h ∈ H) = 0, Assumption (A10) is
satisfied.
Therefore, to ensure the existence of equilibrium, it is sufficient to guarantee that Assumption
(A6) holds. However, this is not necessarily the case, because sets (Zhθ ;h ∈ H) do not induce
restrictions on θj1 and, hence, the quantity of debt on assets j 6= j1 is not necessarily bounded.
Since in our main result we ensure the existence of an equilibrium where
∑
h∈H
(θ
h
j1 − ϕhj1) = 0, there
are natural upper bounds for the amount of borrowing on any debt contract. Indeed, collateral
constraints induce upper bounds for positions on debt contract j1 (as a function of consumption
and collateral coefficients); using the market feasibility condition referred above, we obtain upper
bounds for (θ
h
j1 ;h ∈ H). Thus, using the continuity and positivity of collateral requirements, col-
lateral constraints induce upper bounds for positions on debts contracts j 6= j1. In short, we can
restrict, without loss of generality, the space of admissible debt to a compact set. This process
assure the validity of Assumption (A6), and the existence of equilibria, in an abstract market whose
equilibria are equilibria of the original economy.
Utility penalties as additional payment enforcement. We want to extend the seminal
model of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990, 2005) (see also Zame (1993)) to allow for incomplete
financial participation, debts backed by physical or financial collateral, and non-ordered preferences
negatively affected by amounts of default.
Following the notations of the previous applications, suppose that the set of debt contracts can
be partitioned into a finite number of non-empty subsets (Ak; k ∈ {1, . . . , r}) in such form that,
for any agent h ∈ H the correspondence Φh associates to any (p, x) ∈ ∆S+1 × X the portfolios
4Note that, in this application, the matrix B is characterized by bk,j = 1 if and only if both k 6= j1 and j = j1.
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(θ, ϕ) ∈ Zh that satisfy
x0 ≥
∑
j∈J1
Cj(p0)ϕj , θj ≥
r∑
m=k+1
∑
j′∈Am
(Cj′(p0))j ϕj′ , ∀j ∈ Ak, ∀k ∈ {2, . . . , r}
In addition, suppose that, for any (s, j) ∈ S × J , Ωs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj) = [Ts,j(p0, ps)ϕj , psAs,jϕj ] ,
where Ts,j : ∆×∆→ R is recursively defined by
Ts,j(p0, ps) =

min {psAs,j , psYsCj(p0)} , if j ∈ A1,
min
{
psAs,j ,
k∑
m=1
∑
j′∈Jm
(Cj(p0))j′ Ts,j′(p0, ps)
}
, if j ∈ Ak+1, k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}.
Thus, we have a pyramidal financial structure. The first tier A1 is composed by debt contracts
that are collateralized by physical goods and make real promises (As,j ; (s, j) ∈ S ×A1). In the next
levels, (Ak)1<k≤r, debt contracts are real assets backed by securities that belongs on the previous
tiers. Since collateral guarantees are seized in case of default, borrowers always decide to pay, at
least, the minimum between the value of the original promise and the collateral value.
However, additional payment enforcement mechanism may induce debtors to increase their pay-
ments. To capture this effect, assume that for any (s, j) ∈ S × J there is a threshold as,j ≥ 0 such
that, if the amount of default of a borrower of j at s in greater than as,j , then he can receives a
punishment. More precisely, if agent h ∈ H negotiates ϕj units of debt contract j and decides to
pay an amount of resources δs,j ∈ Ωs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj) at state of nature s, then the amount of default
that can affect individuals preferences is given by
dhs,j(p0, ps, γj , ϕj , δs,j) =
[psAs,jϕj − δs,j − as,j ]+,
psvs
,
where vs ∈ RL++ is a fixed bundle. Also, we assume that agents can not be benefited if he increase
the amount of default, i.e., for any x ∈ X, (x, d) /∈ Ph(x, d′) when d′ ≤ d. Particularly, we have the
case where agents have preferences represented by utility functions and suffer linear utility penalties
proportional to the total amount of default, i.e. (as,j ; (s, j) ∈ S × J ) = 0 (as in the original
contribution of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990, 2005)).
To guarantee the existence of equilibrium, is enough to ensure the validity of Assumptions (A1)-
(A10). With this objective, assume that sets (Zh;h ∈ H) satisfy the conditions imposed in the
previous applications and Zhθ = RJ+ for any h ∈ H. Suppose that, for each j ∈ A1, Cj : ∆ → RL+
is a continuous function and there exist a non-empty set Lj ⊆ L such that, for any p0 ∈ ∆,
Cj,l(p0) 6= 0 ⇔ l ∈ Lj . Also, for each j ∈ Ak+1, where k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, the functions Cj : ∆ →
Rn(k)+ , n(k) = #
k⋃
r=1
Ar, are continuous and there exist a Ej ⊂
k⋃
r=1
Ar such that for each p0 ∈ ∆,
(Cj(p0))j′ 6= 0 ⇔ j′ ∈ Ej . On the other hand, for each (s, j) ∈ S × J , Ts,j is continuous and
that for any j ∈ J , there exists s ∈ S such that, As,j 6= 0, and
( ∑
l′∈L1
Ys(l, l′); l ∈ L
)
6= 0. Thus,
Assumptions (A3)-(A5) and (A7)-(A9) are satisfied.
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It is easy to see that the functions dhs,j are continuous and convex in (ϕ
h, δh) and that satisfies
Assumption (A10). Therefore, if we impose hypotheses (A1)-(A2), our main theorem ensures that
equilibrium exists, provided that Assumption (A6) holds.
As in the previous application, we can impose bounds on admissible debt as a consequence
of the pyramiding structure of the financial market. Market feasibility conditions and collateral
constraints ensure the existence of natural upper bounds for investment on securities in A1. Thus,
using collateral constraints again, we obtain natural upper bounds for debt on contract that belongs
to A2. By analogous arguments, we can found upper bounds on debt that do not change the set of
equilibria of the economy.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this work we address a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial participation.
Different to previous results on this topic, we do not include financial survival assumptions or
financial accessibility conditions to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Essentially, we
extend the model of Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) to allow for non-ordered preferences, price
dependent financial restrictions, and securitization of debts.
We introduce two key assumptions in our abstract model: impatience on consumption and the
absence of cycles on the relationship between investment requirements and access to credit. With this
conditions, we can prove the existence of equilibrium in a financial model that allow for exclusive
credit contracts and investment clubs. We also obtain extensions of models of the literature of
general equilibrium to allow for credit risk, collateralized loans and utility punishment for default.
Particularly, we generalize the results of Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Zame (1995) and Geanakoplos
and Zame (1997, 2002, 2007), including restricted financial participation, price dependent collateral
(physical or financial) and non-ordered preferences. Also, we extend the model of default and utility
punishment of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990, 2005) and Zame (1993), allowing for more
general types of punishments.
As a matter of future research, it is interesting to analyze the role of restricted financial par-
ticipation in sequential models with incomplete financial markets and infinite time horizon. How
general financial constraints are related with no-Ponzi schemes conditions, or the relationship be-
tween financial survival, equilibrium existence and uniform impatience can be studied.
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Appendix
To prove the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium in our abstract economy, we will start by
redefine the condition that characterize an individual optimal plan. Thus, for any h ∈ H, consider
the correspondence Ah : ∆S+1 × RJ+ × E E given by
Ah(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)) = [Dhp,γ ]
−1 (Ph (Dh(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)))) ,
where, for any (p, γ) ∈ ∆S+1×RJ+, the function Dhp,γ : E→ X×RSJ+ is defined by Dhp,γ(x, θ, ϕ, δ) =
Dh(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)). It follows that, under prices (p, q, γ) ∈ P and payments R ∈ RSJ+ , a budget
feasible plan (xh, θh, ϕh, δh) ∈ E is optimal for agent h if and only if
Ah(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)) ∩Bh(p, q, γ,R) = ∅.
Under Assumption (A1), for any h ∈ H, the correspondence Ah has open graph and convex
values.5 Moreover, if we consider the correspondence Aˆh : ∆S+1 × RJ+ × E E defined by
Aˆh(p, γ, z) = {(1− λ)z′ + λz : z′ ∈ A(p, γ, z) ∧ λ ∈ [0, 1)},
then a sufficient condition for a plan (x, θ, ϕ, δ) ∈ Bh(p, q, γ,R) be an optimal choice for agent
h is that Aˆh(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)) ∩ Bh(p, q, γ,R) = ∅. This result is a consequence of the fact that
5Suppose that ((p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)); (ex, eθ, eϕ, eδ)) ∈ Graph[Ah], then a = (Dh(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ));Dh(p, γ, (ex, eθ, eϕ, eδ))) ∈
Graph[ Ph]. Since the graph of the correspondence Ph is an open set relative to (X× RSJ+ )2 (Assumption (A1)), it
follows that there is 1 > 0 such that B1 (a) ∩ (X × RSJ+ )2 ⊆ Graph[Ph], where for any pair (, a) ∈ R++ × Rk we
have B(a) := {a′ ∈ Rk : ‖a− a′‖ < }. Therefore, there exists 2 > 0 such thath
B2 (D
h(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)))×B2 (Dh(p, γ, (ex, eθ, eϕ, eδ)))i\(X× RSJ+ )2 ⊆ Graph[Ph].
The continuity of function Dh and Dhp,γ (Assumption (A10)) assures that both [D
h]−1
`
B2 (D
h(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)))
´
and [Dhp,γ ]
−1
“
B2 (D
h(p, γ, (ex, eθ, eϕ, eδ)))” are open sets, which implies that, for some 3 > 0,
h
B3 (p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)) × B3 (ex, eθ, eϕ, eδ)i\h(X× RJ+ × E)× Ei ⊆ Graph[Ah].
Finally, it follows that there is 4 > 0 such that B4 ((p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)); (ex, eθ, eϕ, eδ))Tˆ(X× RJ+ × E)× E˜ ⊆ Graph[Ah].
That is, the graph of the correspondence Ah is open relative to the set (∆S+1 × RJ+ × E)× E.
On the other hand, if z = (ex, eθ, eϕ, eδ) and z′ = (ex′, eθ′, eϕ′, eδ′) belongs to Ah(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)), then Dh(p, γ, z) and
Dh(p, γ, z′) are both in Ph(Dh(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ))). Since the correspondence Ph has convex values, we have that,
for any λ ∈ [0, 1], λDh(p, γ, z) + (1 − λ)Dh(p, γ, z′) ∈ Ph(Dh(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)). The convexity of the function dh
(Assumption (A10)), assures that for any λ ∈ [0, 1], we have that Dh(p, γ, λz + (1 − λ)z′) ≤ λDh(p, γ, z) + (1 −
λ)Dh(p, γ, z′). Therefore, Assumption (A1) and the definition of Dh guarantee that, independently of λ ∈ [0, 1],
Dh(p, γ, λz + (1 − λ)z′h(Dh(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)). Equivalently, λz + (1 − λ)z′ ∈ Ah(p, γ, (x, θ, ϕ, δ)), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], which
concludes the proof.
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Ah(p, γ, z) ⊆ Aˆh(p, γ, z), for any (p, γ, z) ∈ ∆S+1 × RJ+ × E. In addition, for any h ∈ H, the corre-
spondence Aˆh has open graph and convex values.6
Given (n,m) ∈ N× N, we consider an abstract game G(n,m) in which prices (p, q, γ) belongs to
the set P̂m := ∆S+1 ×Qm, where Qm :=
{
(q, γ) ∈ RJ+ × RJ+ : qj = γj ∈ [0,m], ∀j ∈ J
}
.
Let R = ∏
(s,j)∈S×J
[0, 2M ] and W = max
(s,l)∈S∗×L
∑
h∈H
Whs,l.
For any agent h ∈ H, letBhn,m : P̂m×R Yn be the correspondence defined byBhn,m(p, q, γ,R) :=
Bh(p, q, γ,R)
⋂
Yn, where Yn := [0, n]L × [0, 2W ]SL ×Kn × [0, 2M κn]SJ , and
Kn =
{
(θ, ϕ) ∈ RJ+ × RJ+ : max
j∈J
ϕj ≤ 2κn, max
j∈J
θj ≤ 2κnH
}
,
κn = max
h∈H
max
x∈[0,n]L×[0,2W ]SL
max
p∈∆S+1
max
ϕ∈piϕ(Φh)(p,x)
∑
j∈J
ϕj
= max
h∈H
max
p∈∆S+1
max
ϕ∈piϕ(Φh)(p,((n,...,n),(2W,...,2W )))
∑
j∈J
ϕj .
Note that, the last equality in the definition of κn follows from Assumption (A3)(iii). More-
over, κn is well defined, because ∆S+1 is compact and, for any h ∈ H, the correspondence
piϕ(Φh) : ∆S+1 × X  RJ+ defined by piϕ(Φh)(p, x) =
{
ϕ ∈ RJ+ : ∃θ ∈ RJ+, (θ, ϕ) ∈ Φh(p, x)
}
is
continuous on p, with non-empty and compact values (see Assumptions (A3)(i), (A3)(iii) and (A6)).
In G(n,m), associated to any h ∈ H, we consider a correspondence Γhn,m : YHn × P̂m ×R Yn,
which is defined by
Γhn,m (z, (p, q, γ), R) =

B˚hn,m(p, q, γ,R), if z
h /∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R),
B˚hn,m(p, q, γ,R)
⋂
Aˆh(p, γ, zh), if zh ∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R),
where z := (zk; k ∈ H) is a generic element of YHn , and the set B˚hn,m(p, q, γ,R) is given by the
collection of allocations zh = (xh, θh, ϕh, δh) ∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R) which satisfy,
p0x
h
0 +
∑
j∈J
(qjθhj − γjϕhj ) < p0wh0 ; psxhs < pswhs + psYsxh0 +
∑
j∈J
(Rs,jθhj − δhs,j), ∀s ∈ S.
Moreover, we introduce a correspondence Γ0n,m : YHn × P̂m × R  ∆ × Qm which associates to
any (z, (p, q, γ), R) ∈ YHn × P̂m ×R the set of prices (p′0, q′, γ′) ∈ ∆×Qm such that,
p′0
∑
h∈H
(xh0 −Wh0 ) +
∑
j∈J
∑
h∈H
(q′jθ
h
j − γ′jϕhj ) > p0
∑
h∈H
(xh0 −Wh0 ) +
∑
j∈J
∑
h∈H
(qjθhj − γjϕhj ).
6See Bich and Cornet (2003, page 12).
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For each s ∈ S, let Γsn,m : YHn × P̂m ×R ∆ be the correspondence
Γsn,m(z, (p, q, γ), R) =
{
p′s ∈ ∆ : p′s
∑
h∈H
(xhs −Whs ) > ps
∑
h∈H
(xhs −Whs )
}
.
Finally, for any (s, j) ∈ S × J , define Γs,jn,m : YHn × P̂m ×R [0, 2M ] by
Γs,jn,m(z, (p, q, γ), R) =
{
R′s,j ∈
[
νs,j(p0, ps)
2
, 2M
]
:
−
(
R′s,j
∑
h∈H
ϕhj −
∑
h∈H
δhs,j
)2
> −
(
Rs,j
∑
h∈H
ϕhj −
∑
h∈H
δhs,j
)2}
.
Definition. Given (n,m) ∈ N× N, an equilibrium for the abstract game G(n,m) is a vector(
(zh)h∈H; (p, q, γ);R
) ∈ YHn × P̂m ×R
such that, for any k ∈ H ∪ S∗ ∪ (S × J ), Γkn,m
(
(zh)h∈H; (p, q, γ);R
)
= ∅.
Lemma 1. Given (n,m, h) ∈ N × N ×H, under Assumptions (A2)-(A3) and (A6)-(A8) the corre-
spondence B˚hn,m is lower hemicontinuous.
Proof. Fix (p, q, γ,R) ∈ P̂m × R. It follows from Assumptions (A2), (A3)(iii) and (A8) that,
for any h ∈ H, the plan (0.5wh0 , (0, 25Whs ; s ∈ S), 0, 0, 0) ∈ B˚hn,m(p, q, γ,R). Consider a sequence
{(pk, qk, γk, Rk)}k∈N ⊂ P̂m × R that converges to (p, q, γ,R). To assure the lower-hemicontinuity
of B˚n,m it is sufficient to prove that, for any (xh, θh, ϕh, δh) ∈ B˚hn,m(p, q, γ,R), there is k > 0
and a sequence
{
(xhk , θ
h
k , ϕ
h
k , δ
h
k )
}
k≥k which converges to (x
h, θh, ϕh, δh) such that, for any k ≥ k,
(xhk , θ
h
k , ϕ
h
k , δ
h
k ) ∈ B˚hn,m(pk, qk, γk, Rk).
Take as given (xh, θh, ϕh, δh) ∈ B˚hn,m(p, q, γ,R). It follows from Assumption (A3)(i) that there
exists a sequence {(θhk , ϕhk)}k∈N ⊂ Kn that converges to (θh, ϕh), such that (θhk , ϕhk) ∈ Φh(pk, xh).
Furthermore, since {(pk, ϕhk)}k∈N converges to (p, ϕh), Assumption (A7) assures that there exist a
sequence {δhk}k∈N that converges to δh, such that δhk,s,j ∈ Ωs,j(pk,0, pk,s, γk,j , ϕhk,j) for each (k, s, j) ∈
N×S×J . Therefore, since the sequence {(xh, θhk , ϕhk , δhk )}k∈N converges to (xh, θh, ϕh, δh), it follows
from the definition of B˚hn,m that there exist a k ∈ N such that (xh, θhk , ϕhk , δhk ) ∈ B˚hn,m(pk, qk, γk, Rk)
for any k ≥ k. Thus, B˚hn,m is a lower hemicontinuous correspondence. 
Lemma 2. Given (n,m) ∈ N × N, under Assumptions (A1)-(A3), (A6)-(A8) and (A10), for any
k ∈ H ∪ S∗ ∪ (S × J ) the correspondence Γkn,m is lower hemicontinuous and has convex values.
Proof. It is not difficult to verify that (Γsn,m)s∈S∗ and (Γ
s,j
n,m)(s,j)∈S×J are lower hemicontinuous
with convex values. Assumptions (A1), (A3)(ii), (A7) and (A10) assure that, for any h ∈ H, the
correspondence Γhn,m has convex values too.
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To guarantee the lower hemicontinuity of Γhn,m at a point (z, (p, q, γ,R)), consider a sequence
{(zk, (pk, qk, γk, Rk))}k∈N ⊂ YHn × P̂m × R that converges to (z, (p, q, γ,R)) and fix an element
b ∈ Γhn,m(z, (p, q, γ,R)).
If zh /∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R), then b ∈ B˚hn,m(p, q, γ,R). Since the correspondence B˚hn,m is lower
hemicontinuous, it follows that there is a sequence {bk}k∈N ⊂ Yn such that, for any k ∈ N, bk ∈
B˚hn,m(pk, qk, γk, Rk) and bk converges to b as k goes to infinity. By Assumptions (A3) and (A7),
Bhn,m has closed graph and, therefore, for k high enough z
h
k /∈ Bhn,m(pk, qk, γk, Rk). That is, there
is k ∈ N, such that bk ∈ Γhn,m(zk, (pk, qk, γk, Rk)), for any k ≥ k. This proves that Γhn,m is lower
hemicontinuous at (z, (p, q, γ,R)).
Alternatively, if zh ∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R) then b ∈ B˚hn,m(p, q, γ,R) ∩ Aˆh(p, γ, zh). Since the cor-
respondence Λ(z˜h, p˜, q˜, γ˜, R˜) := B˚hn,m(p˜, q˜, γ˜, R˜) ∩ Aˆh(p˜, γ˜, z˜h) is non-empty at (zh, p, q, γ, R), the
correspondence Aˆh has open graph, and B˚hn,m is lower hemicontinuous, it follows that Λ is lower
hemicontinuous at (zh, p, q, γ, R) (see Border (1985, Proposition 11.21.(c))). Thus, there is a se-
quence {bk}k∈N ⊂ Yn which converges to b and, for any k ∈ N, satisfies bk ∈ B˚hn,m(pk, qk, γk, Rk) ∩
Aˆh(pk, γk, zhk ) ⊂ B˚hn,m(pk, qk, γk, Rk). This last property implies that bk ∈ Γhn,m(zk, (pk, qk, γk), Rk),
for any k ∈ N. Thus, Γhn,m is lower hemicontinuous at (z, (p, q, γ,R)). 
Lemma 3. Given (n,m) ∈ N×N, under Assumptions (A1), (A3)-(A4) and (A7)-(A9), there exists
an equilibrium for the abstract game G(n,m).
Proof. The correspondences {Γkn,m}k∈H∪S∗∪(S×J ) have the same domain, which is equal to the
cartesian product of image spaces. In addition, these correspondences do not have fixed points, they
are lower hemicontinuous and have convex values. Applying Gale-Mas-Colell Fixed Point Theorem
(see Gale and Mas-Colell (1975, 1979)), we obtain an equilibrium for G(n,m). 
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A10), there is (n,m) ∈ N × N such that, for any n > n, if(
(zh)h∈H, (p, q, γ), R
)
is an equilibrium of G(n,m) and max
(h,l)∈H×L
xh0,l ≤W , then max
j∈J
qj < m.
Proof. Fix (n,m) ∈ N×N. Given an equilibrium of G(n,m), ((zh)h∈H, (p, q, γ,R)), for any h ∈ H,
let d
h
= dh(p, γ, ϕh, δ
h
). Then, it follows from Assumptions (A1)-(A2) that, for any h ∈ H,
((y0 + τ, (ys; s ∈ S)), 0) ∈ Ph(xh, d
h
),
where the plan y = (ys; s ∈ S∗) ∈ RL(S+1)++ satisfies y0 =
∑
k∈H
wk0 and, for any state of nature s ∈ S,
ys := (ys,l; l ∈ L) =
(
0.5 min
k∈H
W ks,l; l ∈ L
)
. In addition, as max
(h,l)∈H×L
xh0,l ≤W , we can consider the
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bundle τ = (τl; l ∈ L) given by
τl =
∑
k∈H
max
xk∈[0,W ]L×[0,2W ]SL
τkl (x
k, y), ∀l ∈ L.
Thus, it follows from Assumption (A1) and the definition of Aˆh that, for any vector (θ˜h, ϕ˜h, δ˜h) ∈
Kn × [0,Mκn]SJ which satisfies dh(p, γ, ϕ˜h, δ˜h) = 0,
((y0 + τ, (ys; s ∈ S)), θ˜h, ϕ˜h, δ˜h) ∈ Aˆh(p, γ, zh), ∀h ∈ H.
Since for any h ∈ H, B˚hn,m(p, q, γ,R) ∩ Aˆh(p, γ, zh) = ∅, it follows that Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R) ∩
Aˆh(p, γ, zh) = ∅.7 Therefore, for any vector (θ˜h, ϕ˜h, δ˜h) ∈ Kn×[0,Mκn]SJ such that dh(p, γ, ϕ˜h, δ˜h) =
0, we have that ((y0 + τ, (ys; s ∈ S)), θ˜h, ϕ˜h, δ˜h) /∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R).
On the other hand, as a consequence of Assumptions (A3)(i), (A3)(iii), (A4) and (A6), we have
that, for any j ∈ J , the function vj : ∆L(S+1) → R defined by
vj(p) =
∑
h∈H
max
ϕh∈piϕ(Φh)(p,c)∩[0,2κ1]J
ϕhj
is continuous and strictly positive, where c := (y0 + τ, (ys; s ∈ S)). Therefore, there is µ strictly
positive, such that, µ ≤ vj(p), for all p ∈ ∆L(S+1).
For any j ∈ J , it follows from Assumptions (A3)(ii), (A3)(iii) and (A4) that the set of agents h
for which max
ϕh∈piϕ(Φh)(p,c)∩[0,2κ1]J
ϕhj is strictly positive, i.e.,
Hj(p) := {h ∈ H : ∃(θh, ϕh) ∈ Φh(p, c) ∩K1, ϕhj > 0}
is non-empty. It follows from Assumption (A4) that we can always fix, for any h ∈ Hj(p), a portfolio
(θˆh(j), ϕˆh(j)) ∈ Φh(p, c) ∩K1 such that, (θˆhk (j); k ∈ J \ Jj) = 0, and
ϕˆh(j) ∈ argmaxϕh∈piϕ(Φh)(p,c)∩[0,2κ1]J ϕhj .
Let ρˆ = minh∈H
{
min
(s,l)∈S×L
0.5Whs,l
2Jκ1M
, 1
}
. Then, for any h ∈ Hj(p), given admissible payments
δ˜hs,j′ ∈ Ωs,j′(p0, ps, γ, ρˆϕˆhj′(j)), with j′ ∈ J , we have that,∑
j′∈J
δ˜hs,j′ ≤M
∑
j′∈J
ρˆϕˆhj′(j) ≤ min
(s,l)∈S×L
0.5Whs,l ≤ ps(whs + Ysy0 − ys).
Thus, at any state of nature s ∈ S, an agent h ∈ H(j) can choose any feasible plan of payments
associated to the portfolio of debt ρˆϕˆh(j), since the associated cost can be honored with the resources
that become available after the consumption of the bundle ys (without need to take into account
7Suppose that there is bz ∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ, R) ∩ Aˆh(p, γ, zh). Then, it follows from Assumptions (A3)(ii), (A3)(iii)
and (A7) that, for any λ ∈ [0, 1), λbz ∈ B˚hn,m(p, q, γ, R). Moreover, since Aˆh has open graph, for λ high enough we have
that λbz ∈ Aˆh(p, γ, zh). That is, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any λ > λ, λbz ∈ B˚hn,m(p, q, γ, R) ∩ Aˆh(p, γ, zh),
which is a contradiction. Therefore, Bhn,m(p, q, γ, R) ∩ Aˆh(p, γ, zh) = ∅
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the resources obtained by the depreciated value of the bundle τ , or any financial payment associated
to an investment).
Assumption (A10) assures that, for any h ∈ Hj(p), there is a plan of payments δˆh(j) ∈ [0, 2Mκ1]
such that, for each (s, j′) ∈ S×J , δˆhs,j′(j) ∈ Ωhs,j′(p0, ps, γj′ , ρˆϕˆhj′(j)), and dh(p, γ, ρˆϕˆh(j), δˆh(j)) = 0.
It follows that, there is n > W such that, for any n ≥ n,(
(y0 + τ, (ys; s ∈ S)), ρˆθˆh(j), ρˆϕˆh(j), δˆh(j)
)
∈ Yn, ∀h ∈ Hj(p).
Moreover, the arguments made at the beginning of the proof, guarantee that, for any h ∈ Hj(p),
zˆh(j) :=
(
(y0 + τ, (ys; s ∈ S)), ρˆθˆh(j), ρˆϕˆh(j), δˆh(j)
)
/∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R). However, by construction,
plans (zˆh(j);h ∈ Hj(p)) satisfy second period budget set constraints. In addition, the associated
portfolios and debt payments are admissible.8 Thus, we conclude that, for any agent h ∈ Hj(p), the
plan zˆh(j) does not satisfy the first period budget set constraint.
Since q = γ and Assumption (A4) holds, we have
qj ρˆ ϕˆ
h
j (j) +
∑
j′ 6=j
qj′ ρˆϕˆ
h
j′(j)−
∑
j′∈Jj
qj′ ρˆθˆ
h
j′(j) < p0τ + p0
∑
h′ 6=h
wh
′
0 .
We know that, for any (h, j′) ∈ Hj(p)×J , θˆhj′(j) ≤ 2κ1H. Hence, adding over agents h ∈ Hj(p)
and dividing by µ > 0, we obtain that,
qj
µ
∑
h∈Hj(p)
ϕˆhj (j)− α1
∑
j′∈Jj
qj′ ≤ α2 :=
H
µ

∥∥∥∥τ + ∑
h∈H
wh0
∥∥∥∥
Σ
ρˆ
 ,
where α1 = 2κ1H
2
µ . Note that, vj(p) =
∑
h∈Hj(p)
ϕˆhj (j) and, for any j ∈ J ,
∑
j′∈Jj
qj′ =
∑
j′∈J
bj,j′qj′ .
Therefore, using vectorial notation,
q′ − α1B q′ ≤ α2

1
...
1
 ,
which implies that q belongs to the set Ξ(α1, α2) :=
{
q ∈ RJ+ : (I − α1B)q ≤ α2(1, . . . , 1)′
}
. Since
the parameters (α1, α2) depend only on primitive variables of the economy, and the set Ξ(α1, α2) is
bounded,9 it follows that there exists m ∈ N such that max
j∈J
qj < m. 
8Since the correspondence Φh(j)(p, ·) has convex graph and 0 ∈ Φh(j)(p, c) (Assumptions (A3)(ii) and (A3)(iii)),
for any ρ ∈ (0, 1) the portfolio (ρθˆh(j), ρϕˆh(j)) belongs to Φh(j)(p, c).
9Since the matrix B only has coordinates in {0, 1} and α1 > 0, for any α > α1, Ξ(α1, α2) ⊆ Ξ(α, α2). Therefore,
it is sufficient to assure that, for α high enough, the set Ξ(α, α2) is bounded. On the other hand, given α > 0,
(I −αB) is invertible if and only if α−1 is an eigenvalue of B. Since B has at most n real eigenvalues, it follows that
there exists α > 0 such that, (I − αB) is invertible for any α > α.
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Lemma 5. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A11), and for any (n,m) > (n,m), an equilibrium of G(n,m)
is also an equilibrium for our economy.
Proof. Let
(
(zh)h∈H, (p, q, γ,R)
) ∈ YHn × P̂m ×R be a equilibrium of the G(n,m), with (n,m) >
(n,m). We know from Lemma 3 and footnote 3 that, for any agent h ∈ H,
zh ∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R), Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R) ∩ Aˆh(p, γ, zh) = ∅.
Furthermore, since Γ0n,m(z
h, (p, q, γ), R) = ∅, for any (p′0, q′, γ′) ∈ ∆×Qm, we have
p′0
∑
h∈H
(xh0 −Wh0 ) +
∑
j∈J
∑
h∈H
(q′jθ
h
j − γ′jϕhj ) ≤ p0
∑
h∈H
(xh0 −Wh0 ) +
∑
j∈J
∑
h∈H
(qjθ
h
j − γjϕhj ).
As for any agent h, the plan zh belongs to Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R), it follows that the right term in the
inequality above in non-positive. Thus, for any (p′0, q
′J ,
p′0
∑
h∈H
(xh0 −Wh0 ) +
∑
j∈J
q′j
∑
h∈H
(θ
h
j − ϕhj ) ≤ 0.
Suppose that, for some l ∈ L, ∑
h∈H
(xh0,l −Wh0,l) > 0. Then, setting p′0,l = 1, p′0,l′ = 0 for all
l 6= l′, and q′ = 0, we obtain a contradiction with inequality above. Therefore, xh0,l ≤ W , for all
(h, l) ∈ H × L. Moreover, if ∑
h∈H
(θ
h
j − ϕhj ) > 0 then qj = m > m, a contradiction. We obtain that,∑
h∈H
(θ
h − ϕh) ≤ 0.
Since for any (h, l) ∈ H×L, xh0,l ≤W < n, if for some agent h the first period budget constraint on
Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R) is non-binding, then there is x̂
h
0  xh0 , such that (x̂h, θ
h
, ϕh, δ
h
) ∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R).
From the strict monotonicity of Aˆh on x0, we have that Aˆh(p, γ, zh) ∩ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R) 6= ∅, which
contradicts the fact that Γhn,m(z, (p, q, γ), R) = ∅. Thus, for each agent h, the first period budget
constraint holds as an equality.
It follows from arguments above that,
p0
∑
h∈H
(xh0 −Wh0 ) +
∑
j∈J
∑
h∈H
(qjθ
h
j − γjϕhj ) = 0;
∑
h∈H
(xh0 −Wh0 ) ≤ 0, and
∑
h∈H
(θ
h − ϕh) ≤ 0.
If α > α and qˆ ∈ {q ∈ RJ+ : (I − αB)q = α2(1, . . . , 1)′}, then qˆ is an upper bound for Ξ(α, α2). Indeed, for any
q ∈ Ξ(α, α2), we have that (I − αB)q ≤ (I − αB)qˆ. Thus, (I − αB)(qˆ − q) ≥ 0. Hence, Assumption (A5) guarantees
that qˆ ≥ q.
Therefore, we want to prove that, for any α > max{α1, α}, the set {q ∈ RJ+ : (I − αB)q = α2(1, . . . , 1)′} is
non-empty and bounded. Fix α > max{α1, α}. Since the matrix (I − αB) is non-singular (Assumption (A5)), there
exists a unique qα ∈ RJ such that (I−αB)qα = α2(1, . . . , 1)′. Moreover, as α2 > 0, it follows from (A5) that qα ≥ 0.
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Therefore, if for some l ∈ L, we have that ∑
h∈H
xh0,l <
∑
h∈H
Wh0,l, then p0,l = 0. Because x
h
0,l < n, the
strictly monotonicity of Aˆh on first period consumption, implies that Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R)∩Aˆh(p, γ, zh) 6=
∅, a contradiction. We conclude that, p0  0 and
∑
h∈H
(xh0 −Wh0 ) = 0.
On the other hand, given (s, j) ∈ S×J , as Γs,jn,m(z, (p, q, γ), R) = ∅, for each R′s,j ∈
[
νs,j(ps)
2 , 2M
]
we have
−
(
R′s,j
∑
h∈H
ϕhj −
∑
h∈H
δ
h
s,j
)2
≤ −
(
Rs,j
∑
h∈H
ϕhj −
∑
h∈H
δ
h
s,j
)2
If Rs,j
∑
h∈H
ϕhj <
∑
h∈H
δ
h
s,j , then
∑
h∈H
ϕhj > 0 and Assumption (A8) implies that
Rs,j <
∑
h∈H
δ
h
s,j∑
h∈H
ϕhj
≤M,
which is a contradiction, because in this case any R′s,j ∈ (Rs,j , 2M ] that satisfies R′s,j
∑
h∈H
ϕhj ≤∑
h∈H
δ
h
s,j belongs to Γ
s,j
n,m(z, (p, q, γ), R). Analogously, when Rs,j
∑
h∈H
ϕhj >
∑
h∈H
δ
h
s,j , we have that∑
h∈H
ϕhj > 0 and Assumption (A9) assures that,
Rs,j >
∑
h∈H
δhs,j∑
h∈H
ϕhj
≥ νs,j(p0, ps),
which implies that any R′s,j ∈
[
νs,j(p0,ps)
2 , Rs,j
)
that satisfies R′s,j
∑
h∈H
ϕhj ≥
∑
h∈H
δ
h
s,jbelongs to
Γs,jn,m(z, (p, q, γ), R), a contradiction. We conclude that, at each state s ∈ S and for any j ∈ J ,
Rs,j
∑
h∈H
ϕhj =
∑
h∈H
δ
h
s,j .
Using that for each h, zh ∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R), it follows from
∑
h∈H
(θ
h−ϕh) ≤ 0 that, for any s ∈ S,
ps
∑
h∈H
(xhs − (Whs + Ysxh0 )) ≤ 0
Since for any s ∈ S, Γsn,m(zh, (p, q, γ), R) = ∅, it follows that for any p′s ∈ ∆,
p′s
∑
h∈H
(xhs − (Whs + Ysxh0 )) ≤ 0,
which implies that
∑
h∈H
(xhs−(Whs +Ysxh0 )) ≤ 0. Thus, for any (h, s, l) ∈ H×S×L, xhs,l < 2W , which
in turn implies both that (ps; s ∈ S) 0 and that second period budget constraints are satisfied as
equalities (since preferences are strictly monotonic on consumption).
As commodity prices are strictly positive, using Assumption (A9) we obtain that, for each j ∈ J
there is s ∈ S such that Rs,j > 0.
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If for some j ∈ J , ∑
h∈H
(θ
h
j − ϕhj ) < 0 then qj = 0, because first period budget set constraints
hold as an equality, and there is no excess of demand in financial markets. However, as unitary
security payments are non-trivial, i.e. (Rs,j ; s ∈ S) 6= 0, when qj = γj are equal to zero, for
any h ∈ H, θhj = 2Hκn, which contradicts the fact that
∑
h∈H
(θ
h
j − ϕhj ) ≤ 0. Indeed, for any h,
ϕh ∈ piϕ(Φh)(p, xh), which assures that
∑
h∈H
ϕhj ≤ Hκn.
We conclude that, q  0 and ∑
h∈H
(θ
h
j − ϕhj ) = 0. This last property, implies that, for any
(s, j) ∈ S × J ,
Rs,j
∑
h∈H
θ
h
j =
∑
h∈H
δ
h
s,j .
Then ps
∑
h∈H
(xhs − (Whs + Ysxh0 )) = 0. Since ps  0, we obtain that
∑
h∈H
(xhs − (Whs + Ysxh0 )) = 0.
Therefore, market clearing conditions are satisfied.
Finally, for each agent h ∈ H, the plan zh ∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R) ⊂ Bh(p, q, γ,R) and it also belongs
in the interior of Yn relative to E. Therefore, if there is z˜h ∈ Bh(p, q, γ,R) ∩ Ah(p, γ, zh), then for
any λ ∈ [0, 1), the plan (1−λ)zh +λz˜h ∈ Aˆh(p, γ, zh). This assures that, for λ ∈ [0, 1) high enough,
(1 − λ)zh + λz˜h ∈ Bhn,m(p, q, γ,R) ∩ Aˆh(p, γ, zh), a contradiction. That is, for any agent h ∈ H,
Bh(p, q, γ,R) ∩ Ah(p, γ, zh) = ∅. This last property assures the optimality of the plan zh for agent
h, when he is restricted to choose allocations on Bh(p, q, γ,R).
Thus, we assure the existence of equilibrium in our economy. 
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